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Time allocation and performance: the case of Chinese entrepreneurs 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the effect of time allocation on the financial performance of entrepreneurial 
firms. We apply the Lewbel (2012) estimator to a pooled dataset of Chinese private 
manufacturing firms that are managed by their owners. Time is allocated between management, 
networking and study activities. After accounting for endogeneity, we find an inverted U-
shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance and between networking 
and firm performance. However, no relationship between time spent studying and firm 
performance is observed. We also find that the managing hours-performance relationship is 
particularly strong for companies managed by entrepreneurs who own more than 75% of share, 
for companies that are managed by owners with previous experience, for male entrepreneurs 
and for smaller sized firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the effect of time allocation on the performance of Chinese owner-
controlled manufacturing firms. We investigate a research question which is fundamental to the 
success of small business owners, namely: what is the best way to allocate the scarce resource 
of time? Time allocation is particularly important for entrepreneurs because their working hours 
are fragmented into a wide range of activities, (Florén 2006). For example, O’Gorman et al. 
(2005) argue that, over a day, small firm CEOs performed on average, 35 activities. In addition, 
they had to deal with a range of people including subordinates, suppliers and customers. Florén 
and Tell (2012) suggest that managers in fast growing firms spend about 40% more undisturbed 
time on other work than on the daily operational work of the firm. Verheul et al. (2009) find 
that individuals will work fewer hours if they have other income available and that the 
productivity of time is positively related to relevant experience. Therefore, the optimal 
allocation of time between different activities represents a crucial part of the decisions made by 
an entrepreneur.  
We address the time allocation problem by analyzing how financial performance is affected by 
the allocation of time among three different activities, namely managing, networking and 
studying. In contrast to other specifications that employ a positive monotonic time-allocation-
performance relationship (e.g., Ang et al. 2000; Bitler et al. 2005), we propose that there is 
inverted U-shaped relationship between hours allocated to different activities and firm 
performance. The increasing opportunity costs associated with additional hours leads to 
diminishing performance returns. This suggests that too many hours allocated to a specific 
activity, for example investment in social capital, may harm performance because too little time 
is being spent on other important activities such as managing the company or investing in in 
human capital. 
 
The Chinese environment is well-suited to our empirical investigation for two main reasons. 
First, the development of the Chinese economy, with its expansion in entrepreneurial activity, 
provides an interesting framework within which to analyse the importance of time allocation. 
Even though private enterprises were not formally permitted until 1988, nowadays we observe 
the rapid growth and importance of Chinese SMEs (Anderson et al. 2003). For example, in 
2011 they accounted for about 55% of the growth of gross domestic product and 70% of all 
employment (NBSC 2013). Second, the success of private enterprise development in China 
can be partly explained by its cultural values (Robb 2002). Persistent hard work is regarded 
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as a significant characteristic of Chinese entrepreneurs who are more likely to stress a strong 
work ethic (Morris and Schindehutte 2005).  
The study contributes to the empirical literature in two important ways. First, it contributes to 
the entrepreneurship literature by exploring the impact of the time allocation behaviour of 
Chinese entrepreneurs on firm performance. The analysis of three activities, namely managing, 
networking and studying, provides deeper insights into how these activities affect the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Second, the empirical analysis is based on the 
theoretical underpinnings of opportunity costs whereby, beyond a certain point, allocating 
additional hours to one activity rather than to another has an adverse effect on performance. 
Given that time is a constrained resource, we propose an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between managerial activities and the performance of entrepreneurial ventures. We also 
develop the analysis by linking the opportunity cost model to social and human capital theories 
in relation to networking hours and study hours respectively. These links are explored by 
employing the Lewbel (2012) estimator which addresses endogeneity issues.  
Our analysis is based on two extensive nationwide surveys of Chinese private owner-controlled 
manufacturing enterprises across 31 provinces in 2004 and 2006. As hypothesised, we find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and management hours and between 
performance and networking hours. The optimal time spent on management activities is 6.8 
hours per day (or about 34 hours per 5-days week) and on networking it is 4.9 hours per day (or 
about 24.3 hours per 5-days week). This evidence suggests that there are optimal time 
allocations for each of these activities and that beyond a certain number of hours, additional 
hours appear to harm firm performance. We also report qualitatively similar results for firms 
that have male owners. A quadratic relationship with management hours is also found in smaller 
firms, in firms with high ownership shareholdings and in firms with more experienced 
managers. However, we find no relationship between study hours and firm performance in 
either the whole sample or in any of the subsamples analysed. 
The paper therefore provides support for a number of theoretical explanations of the time 
allocation-performance relationship. We find support for the typical labour-leisure trade-off 
theories. Excessive time spent on certain activities will have a detrimental impact on firm 
performance. However, the performance-effort sensitivity may be reduced by agency costs. 
Furthermore, initial social and human capital, measured by previous managerial experience, 
enhances the effect of management effort on performance. Finally, our analysis of the 
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importance of human capital investment produces insignificant outcomes suggesting that a 
longer time period and specific programs of education may be required to observe any benefits 
from the investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of relevant 
literature and discusses the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. Section 
4 describes the data and initial analysis. Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 presents the 
conclusions.  
2. Theory, literature and hypotheses development 
This section provides the theoretical context within which the effects of time allocation on firm 
performance are analysed. Time is an important concept in economics because it is a scarce 
resource. Becker (1965) presents a theory of the allocation of time between different activities. 
The concept of time allocation between different activities has been extended to analyse a 
number of situations including, the factors affecting the allocation of time devoted to a new 
venture whilst remaining employed (Burmeister-Lamp et al. 2012). Others have analysed the 
self-employment or employment decision (Levesque et al. 2002). In addition, there are a 
number of studies that have proposed a non-linear relationship between hours worked and 
factors such as taxation and welfare benefits (Chetty 2012), budget constraints (Beffy et al. 
2014), and restrictions on the number of hours that can be worked (Ham and Reilly 2002). 
There is also a strand of literature that analysed the hours allocation issue in relation to business. 
An entrepreneur’s limited time has to be allocated among a number of activities, (O’Gorman et 
al. 2005). In this paper we define time allocation in terms of the share of each day spent on the 
following activities: management, networking and studying. Furthermore, the effects of all 
these activities on firm performance may differ with respect to institutional setup, for example, 
agency issues or in terms of the size of firms and entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics such 
as previous managerial experience and gender. 
A typical entrepreneurial model (e.g. Holmström and Tirole 1997) assumes a positive, 
monotonic relationship between effort and performance. In this setup, greater effort increases 
profit. There is evidence that increased hours spent on managing will generate benefits for the 
company in the form of improved performance. Bitler et al. (2005) define effort in terms of 
hours worked and report that this has a positive effect on firm performance. Abernethy et al. 
(2013) examine the association between different types of performance measure and the time 
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horizon of business unit managers that have profit responsibilities. They report that managers 
spend most time on short-term horizon activities and least time on long-term horizon activities. 
However, they also find that financial and non-financial performance is positively associated 
with management taking account of longer time horizons. Bandiera et al. (2011) find that, for 
Italian CEOs, time spent with insiders is positively related to firm performance whereas time 
spent with outsiders is not. Bandiera et al. (2013) also find a positive relationship between the 
number of hours worked by Indian CEOs and firm performance. 
There is also limited evidence about the non-linear nature of the hours-performance 
relationship. Bitler et al. (2005) propose a Cobb-Douglas relationship which yields a positive 
relationship between hours and performance. Bandiera et al. (2011 and 2013) assume a linear-
log function and report a positive relationship. This implies that increasing hours associated 
with any activity improves performance. However, consistent with increasing opportunity costs 
and diminishing marginal returns to hours allocated, we propose an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between activity hours and financial performance. We develop a theoretical model 
below to support this proposition.  
2.1 Theoretical Model Framework  
To underpin our econometric specification, we develop a simple theoretical framework. We 
assume that an entrepreneur has a C1 utility function	UሺEሻ	equal to venture profit	πሺEሻ minus 
opportunity costs cሺEሻ. For simplicity, the profit function is assumed to be	πሺEሻ ൌ AE஑, where 
A is the exogenously defined level of an entrepreneur's ability and α  is return on effort, 1 ൐
α ൐ 0. Opportunity costs are parametrized as the linear function of effort ሺEሻ,	cሺEሻ ൌ ηE: 
ܷሺܧሻ ൌ ߨሺܧሻ െ ܿሺܧሻ ൌ ܣܧఈ െ ߟܧ 
0 ൑ ܧ 
ܧ ൑ ܧത 
Effort is constrained not to exceed the exogenous value Eഥ ൐ 0 which corresponds to maximum 
number of hours that an entrepreneur could work (E ൑ Eഥሻ	and non-negativity constraint (0 ൑
E). The internal solution for this setup is: 
E∗ ൌ ൬Aαη ൰
ଵ
ଵି஑
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UሺE∗ሻ ൌ ൬Aαη ൰
ଵ
ଵି஑ ൭ሺAሻ ଵଵି஑ ൬αη൰
஑
ଵି஑ െ η൱ 
The optimal level of effort is a positive relationship with returns to effort (αሻ and entrepreneurs 
ability (A), and a negative relationship with the opportunity costs of effort (η). In this case, we 
would not expect that the relationship between effort and performance to be monotonic, as 
assumed by a typical agency model. This outcome is consistent with the hypotheses set out 
below. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The model therefore shows that it is neither optimal not to work (labour supply is zero) nor to 
work maximum hours. Diminishing marginal returns to entrepreneurial effort will eventually 
set in because of the increasing opportunity costs associated with working beyond the optimal 
time allocation.  
Thus, beyond a certain number of hours, an increase in hours spent on management activities 
means that too little time will be available for other work activities, such as developing social 
and business contacts. This ultimately damages the ability of the business to develop and grow 
and will thus harm performance. We therefore hypothesize that, up to a point, increasing the 
hours allocated to work activities is likely to generate increasing returns but that negative 
marginal returns to the additional hours spent on a specific activity will occur beyond a certain 
time allocation. This enables us to estimate the optimal time allocation between these activities 
and to indicate maximum hours per activity. Therefore, in relation to management hours: 
H1: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent on management tasks 
and financial performance 
It has been argued that the success of business ventures is determined not only by 
entrepreneurial effort but also by financial and social capital (Bosma et al. 2004). Given that 
social capital can be regarded as an asset to an entrepreneur, our second hypothesis deals with 
networking and the effect that increasing social capital has on firm performance. A successful 
manager needs not only to manage the internal operations of the firm, but has also to establish 
external networks and contacts. Social capital may be defined as a means of capturing the 
relationship between actions and outcomes associated with the interactions between groups 
(Adler and Kwon 2002). They differentiate between bridging social capital, external 
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relationships, and bonding social capital, internal relationships. It is the former that is the focus 
of this paper and in particular the effect of investing in social capital defined in terms of 
networking by means such as making business contacts, attending seminars/conferences, 
undertaking public relations and hospitality activities and how this affects firm performance.   
In relation to the returns to social capital, Bosma et al. (2004) argue that small businesses need 
to have stronger ties with for example, clients, investors, debtors, and subcontractors, and that 
therefore the expected benefits relating to social capital are high. They find that investment in 
social and human capital enhances entrepreneurial performance.1 Fafchamps and Minten (2002) 
report a positive relationship between social connections and financial performance. Davidsson 
and Honig (2003) find that social capital has a positive effect on the performance of Swedish 
entrepreneurial firms. Lee and Tsang (2001) report a positive relationship between networking 
and performance for Chinese entrepreneurs in small and medium sized firms in Singapore. Cao 
et al. (2014) also find that social capital has a positive effect on the performance of Chinese 
firms.  
 
Networking is of particular importance to Chinese firms because the guanxi (a form of social 
networking and relationship building) possessed by entrepreneurs is a critical success factor. 
State owned enterprises are able to avoid substantial bureaucratic costs and also have better 
access to resources in in the Chinese economy (Chen et al. 2015), and therefore guanxi is 
essential for private businesses to obtain resources and to navigate bureaucratic structures 
(Talavera et al. 2012). Managers’ guanxi networks may benefit their organizational growth 
through providing information flows, institutional advantages and necessary resources (Sheng 
et al. 2011).  
 
However, an alternative view is that the time spent with outsiders may mostly benefit the 
individual manager without contributing to firm’s performance given that the interests of 
managers and firms may be misaligned (Malmendier and Tate 2009). Too much time spent on 
networking will therefore encroach on the time available for managerial activities. Thus, for 
example, Bandiera et al. (2011 and 2013) find that hours spent networking may benefit the 
manager rather than the firm. However, they analysed the time allocations of CEOs whereas 
this paper analyses the time allocation of owner managers. Therefore, the appropriate 
consideration here is that too much time spent networking may prevent time being allocated to 
deal with strategic and operational business issues rather than time being allocated to benefit 
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the individual manager. This is consistent with our second hypothesis that, beyond a certain 
time allocation, increasing opportunity costs are incurred as additional hours are spent 
networking:  
 
H2: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent on networking and 
financial performance 
Human capital may be defined as the skills and knowledge acquired through schooling, on-the-
job training and experience (Becker 1975). Human capital theory therefore implies a positive 
monotonic relationship between human capital and performance (Florin et al. 2003). In the case 
of entrepreneurs, the greater the human capital, the better able that person is to exploit profitable 
opportunities. Cassar (2006) argue that entrepreneurs with greater human capital will be more 
successful than entrepreneurs with less human capital because they seek to earn a higher return 
on their human capital investment.   
However, Davidsson and Honig (2003) argue that this is not necessarily always the case. For 
example, excessive human capital might affect risk-taking behaviour and decisions to invest. 
They find no evidence that human capital factors affect the performance of nascent 
entrepreneurial firms. Further, the effects of different components of human capital vary. Unger 
et al. (2011) suggest that performance is more likely to be affected by the outcomes of human 
capital investment (knowledge or skills) than by the human capital investments themselves 
(education or years of experience).  
In addition, the effects of formal education may differ relative to the investment in specific 
human capital. For example, Volery et al. (2013) find that entrepreneurial education has a 
positive, but limited effect on human capital. Similarly, Dickson et al. (2008) suggest that the 
effect of general education is not clear but they do find a positive link between specific 
programs of entrepreneurship education and subsequent entrepreneurial success. Finally, the 
education–performance sensitivity might be different with respect to the stages of business 
development or industry characteristics.  
We investigate the impact of the investment in human capital, as measured by the number of 
hours spent studying, has on firm performance. The impact of time spent on studying on the 
business success of an entrepreneur is difficult to predict theoretically. On the one hand, it may 
be argued that entrepreneurs that spend more time studying have a stronger commitment to 
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running their businesses and thus the coefficient for time spent on studying is expected to be 
positive. This is because hours spent on studying will increase a manager’s stock of human 
capital and will also benefit the company via an improved ability to deal with business issues. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that entrepreneurs that spent more time studying will have 
higher opportunity costs associated with spending less time on other activities such as 
managerial functions. There are empirical studies (e.g., Lynskey 2004 and Ganotakis 2012) that 
suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between human capital and firm performance. 
Consistent with this, we hypothesise:  
H3: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent studying and financial 
performance 
The links between activities and performance may change depending on the organizational 
imperfections within entrepreneurial ventures or the personal characteristics of business 
owners. We develop the analysis by looking at two subsamples: the first deals with potential 
agency issues associated with ownership; the second with the importance of previous 
managerial experience.  
First, we analyse potential agency issues by examining the effect of ownership stakes on the 
hours–performance relationship. The separation of ownership and control has long been 
recognised as a source of potential conflict between management and shareholders in the 
context of publicly owned firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The misalignment of interests 
results in agency costs being borne by the owners. However, managerial ownership will reduce 
the incentive to consume perquisites or to undertake sub-optimal decisions. These costs 
diminish as manager shareholdings increase hence leading to a convergence of interests. 
However, increased managerial ownership may also lead to entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 
1983), as managers become insulated from effective monitoring. There have been many studies 
that have analysed the effect of management ownership of the performance of publicly quoted 
companies, for example, Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) for the US, McKnight and 
Weir (2009) for the UK, Rose (2005) for Denmark and Andres (2008) for Germany.   
However, unlike quoted companies, small businesses offer a direct test of the zero agency cost 
model because they will yield cases of 100% ownership. This implies that firms that have 
managerial ownership of less than 100% will incur agency costs and that these costs will 
increase as managerial ownership declines. Consistent with the agency model, Ang et al. (2000) 
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found that agency costs increased as management shareholding decreased. Bitler et al. (2005) 
find that, after controlling for endogeneity, there is a positive relationship between ownership, 
hours worked and performance for privately owned firms. Their finding is consistent with the 
agency model because it suggests that the incentives provided by increased ownership result in 
better firm performance and outweigh any potential entrenchment effects. Their model uses a 
logarithmic specification which shows positive, but diminishing, returns to hours worked. The 
positive result is consistent with the agency incentive argument. Therefore, we expect that the 
incentive effects associated with high managerial ownership will result in a more efficient 
allocation of time between managerial activities and improve firm performance.  
H4: The time allocation–performance relationship is stronger as managerial ownership 
increases.  
The second sample split analyses the impact of management experience on the hours-
performance relationship. As discussed above, entrepreneurial effort as well as social and 
human capital may have a differentiated impact during different stages of firm development. 
Although the pooled nature of the data does not allow us to directly analyse the influence of 
time, we aim to incorporate a temporal element to the analysis by using previous managerial 
experience. This represents an accumulation of knowledge, skills and experience that have been 
gained over time. A number of studies (e.g. Ehrenberg and Smith 2000) suggest that there is a 
positive but non-linear relationship between job experience and performance. However, 
Sturman (2003) finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between time and performance when 
jobs have low complexity. We therefore hypothesis that:  
H5: The time allocation–performance relationship is enhanced by previous management 
experience  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Econometric specification 
Based on our hypotheses, we develop our baseline regression for investigating the relationship 
between the time allocation of managers and the performance of their companies,  
Firm Performancei = α + β Hoursik + δ Hours2ik + γZi + ui  (1) 
Where i is the firm, and ui is the error term. 
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Firm Performancei, is an indicator of operating performance. Consistent with Robb and Watson 
(2012) we use return on assets (ROA) defined as profit after tax normalised by total assets. 
Our key explanatory variable, Hoursik, is a self-reported measure of time spent on each of three 
activities, k ⊂ {	ܯܽ݊ܽ݃݅݊݃, ܰ݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇݅݊݃, ܵݐݑ݀ݕ݅݊݃ }. Respondents were asked how many 
hours each day they spent on the following activities: managing, networking, and studying. In 
the analysis we report the share of hours spent on each activity (hours divided by 24).2  
Vector Zi includes a number of control variables that account for firm and manager 
characteristics. To control for firm size, we use the logarithm of total sales.3 Log(firm age) is 
the natural log of firm age in years. Entrepreneurial characteristics are also expected to be 
important in the relationship between time allocation and firm performance. Age is the log of 
the age of the entrepreneur in years; Female is a dummy variable that is 1 if the entrepreneur is 
female and 0 if male; Single is a dummy variable that is 1 if the manager is a single decision 
maker and 0 if not; Education is 1 if entrepreneur has university education and 0 if not. 
Ownership is the share (%) of the firm owned by the entrepreneur. Management experience is 
a dummy variable that is 1 if the entrepreneur has any managerial experience before, and 0 if 
not. Finally, we include industry, region and year dummy variables.  
Although we use data from two consecutive waves of the Chinese Enterprise Survey, we cannot 
make use of panel data techniques because there are no means of tracking the same firms over 
both waves. We, therefore, use pooled data analysis. The hours-performance relationship may 
be simultaneous. For example, Verheul et al. (2009) run regressions with both hours and profit 
as dependent variables and estimate them by using the same independent variables. To address 
the two-way relationship between hours and performance we utilise an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach. The traditional IV approach depends on the validity of the instruments however 
finding a suitable instrument set is not a trivial exercise. To address this issue, we make use of 
the approach of Lewbel (2012) which generates a set of internal instruments. 
The Lewbel (2012) procedure consists of two stages. Let us assume that we have ߮ଵ …߮௡ 
endogenous variables and ݔଵ …ݔ௞  exogenous variables. In the first stage we run n OLS 
regressions with the endogenous variables, ߶௜	as the dependent variables and the exogenous 
variables ݔଵ …ݔ௞  as independent variables. After this step we generate predicted residuals 
(ݑଵ …ݑ௡). Then we use these residuals to construct an instrument vector ݖଵ … ݖ௡ for each ݅ ∈
1. . ݊,	 we estimate ݖ௜ ൌ ሺ߮௜ െ ప߮ഥ ሻݑ௜, where ప߮ഥ  is the mean of ߮௜. Note that this approach is 
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valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity in the first stage, as has been proved by the Breusch-
Pagan (1979) test. In the second stage we run two-step IV-GMM by treating time allocation as 
endogenous and instrument it with the internally generated regressors.  
In addition to the internally generated instruments discussed above, we also create a vector of 
externally selected instruments that are likely to affect time allocation but not performance. The 
instruments include variables related to management team characteristics and the entrepreneur's 
household and family, namely the natural logarithm of household expenditure, the natural 
logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the share of personal income in total household income, 
and the natural logarithm of management team size. None of these measures are directly linked 
with the performance of entrepreneurial ventures, but are likely to affect the time allocation of 
business owners. For example, larger families and higher household expenditures may increase 
the motivation of entrepreneurs to work longer hours, whereas if the entrepreneur makes a small 
contribution to the family budget, this may have a negative effect on hours worked. Increased 
team size will increase effort because the entrepreneur will have to spend more time monitoring 
the activities of the team.  
The validity of our estimation depends on two important characteristics. First, there should be 
a zero correlation between the instruments and the error term. To test this assumption we make 
use of the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test. Second, there should be a strong correlation 
between the instruments selected and the instrumented variables. We test this proposition by 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic which is also known as underidentification test.  
4. Sample and data analysis 
Our sample consists of manufacturing firm-level data taken from a nationwide sample survey 
of privately owned Chinese enterprises. The survey gathers information on a sample of 
registered businesses in the private sector and has been conducted every two years from 1991 to 
2006 by three major business associations (the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(ACFIC), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (SASS).4 The analysis in this paper is conducted using data pooled over 2004 
and 2006. There are 3,837 firms observed in 2006 survey and 3,012 firms in 2004 survey. These 
two years had consistent sets of questions whereas earlier surveys asked different questions. The 
dataset represents the largest and most comprehensive source of information on Chinese private 
enterprises. One of the database’s strengths is that the survey has a response rate of around 85%. 
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The surveys sought information about enterprise owners, the nature of their firms, their 
management practices and the performance of their businesses. To ensure a focus on owner-
managers, we first identify 5,384 non-listed firms where the largest owner is an individual. 
Then, we restrict the sample to the 3,413 firms in which the manager owns at least 50% of the 
company. To minimize potential misreporting of the time allocation measures, we only include 
firms for which the total value for managing, studying and networking hours less than 16. This 
gives 3,074 observations. We then exclude firms for which the total number of hours spent on 
all three activities exceeded 24 as well as firms with zero work hours. This restricts our sample 
to 3,038 observations. Next we ensure that each respondent answered all relevant questions. 
This gives a final sample of 1,776 observations. The self-reported time allocation patterns of 
the owner-managers are used to develop a measure of time utilization. Owner-managers are 
asked to specify the number of hours they spend on average on the following activities per 
day: management, networking, and studying.  
Insert Table 1 
Table 1 presents variable definitions and summary statistics based on the estimation sample. 
On average, each day, entrepreneurs spend, 6.8 hours on management activities, 3.8 hours on 
networking activities and 1.6 hours to studying. Their total daily hours allocated to work 
(managing and networking) are 10.6 hours or 53 hours per week. This is slightly higher than 
worked by the CEOs of Italian companies who average around 48 hours over a 5 day-week 
(Bandiera et al. 2011). However, it is consistent with Hyytinen and Ruuskanen (2007) who 
report that the self-employed work more hours than those employed in organisations. The 
average age of Chinese entrepreneurs is 43 years old. Only 18.1% have university degree. The 
share of female entrepreneurs is quite low at 12.5%. Figure 1 plots the densities for management 
hours (measured as a share of 24 hours) for both male and female entrepreneurs. It reveals 
similar distributions of the management hours variable by gender. 
Insert Figure 1 
The mean firm age is 5.6 years. Average ownership share is 81.2%. 56.5% are defined as single 
decision-makers and 29% have previous management experience. Finally, private firms in our 
sample are profitable with an average 32.7% return on assets. Fung et al. (2007) use the same 
survey data in their study. They report that in wave 2000 and 2002, entrepreneurs’ average age 
is 44 years old; 90 percent of them are male and more than a third have college degrees or 
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higher. The average sales revenue in their sample is 21.6 million RMB (2.6 million USD) in 
2002 and 18.7 million RMB (2.3 million USD) in 2000. The average firm age was six years in 
2000 and seven years in 2002. The descriptive statistics in our sample are consistent with 
previous studies using the same survey data. 
Insert Table 2 
Table 2 presents correlation matrix for the firm-level variables employed in our analysis. The 
coefficients indicate no strong correlation among explanatory variables. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) statistics are employed to test multicollinearity and suggest no evidence of 
multicollinearity in our empirical models.  
Insert Table 3 
Table 3 summarizes management, networking and study hours by ownership, management 
experience, gender, and size. As Panel A shows, we observe that managing and studying hours 
are not statistically different for firms with high (equal to or less than 75%) and those with a 
very high level (above 75%) of managerial ownership. However, lower stake owners are likely 
to spend more hours networking than higher stake owners. Panel B reports that, small business 
owners without management experience spend more (less) time on managing (networking) 
activities compared to their counterparts with management experience. Panel C shows that, 
relative to male entrepreneurs, on average female entrepreneurs spent significantly more hours 
on management activities but significantly fewer hours per day on networking. There are no 
differences between female and male entrepreneurs in relation to time spent on study. Finally, 
Panel D suggests that entrepreneurs managing larger firms spend more time on both networking 
and study hours than their counterparties running small businesses however there is no 
difference in the hours allocated to management activities.  
5. Results 
5.1 Whole sample 
Insert Table 4 
Table 4 presents results using the Lewbel (2012) estimator with both internal and external 
instruments. Hours are measured as a share of 24 hours. We report the underidentification 
(Kleibergen-Paap LM) and overidentification (Hansen J) test results. For all three equations, 
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the underidentification tests rejects the hypothesis that instruments are weak and that asymptotic 
theory provides a poor guide to actual finite-sample distributions. The overidentification tests 
do not reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. We also perform the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test for the regressions and find no evidence of multicollinearity. F-tests 
reported in Table 4 reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero. 
The results in Table 4 show support for Hypothesis 1. We find, as hypothesised, a statistically 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance. Thus, 
up to a maximum of 6.8 hours, increasing the number of hours allocated for management hours 
increases profitability. However additional time, above 6.8 hours per day, spent on these 
activities reduces profitability. The 95% confidence interval ranges from 5.2 to 8.4. There are 
two possible reasons behind the inverted U-shaped link. First, the labour-leisure model assumes 
diminishing marginal productivity of entrepreneurs. Second, motivation and aspiration could 
also be reduced with time spent on managing which in its turn increases opportunity costs. 
Despite these two facts, we find that 23.6% of owner managers spent in excess of 8.4 hours per 
day on management activities. The reallocation of time may have a positive effect on firm 
performance.  
The estimates for networking hours also reveal statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
relationship between time spent on increasing social capital and the return on assets of Chinese 
entrepreneurs. The finding supports Hypothesis 2 and is in line with Bosma et al. (2004) and 
Lee and Tsang (2001) who also argue that not only initial social capital, but also investment in 
social capital affects performance. However, the link between social capital and the return on 
assets is not monotonic. The maximum allocation is estimated to be 4.9 hours per day but 
beyond that, additional hours spent on networking harm performance. The 95% confidence 
interval ranges from 3.4 to 6.3 hours per day. Our data reveal that 60.4% of entrepreneurs spend 
time on networking outside this interval. Our results therefore suggest that the reallocation of 
time between activities will have a beneficial effect on performance.  
In relation to Hypothesis 3, we find no evidence to support the hypothesis that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between time spent studying and firm performance. This result 
is in line with Unger et al. (2011) who find that the outcomes of human capital investment (e.g. 
skills) are more important than human capital investment itself (e.g. time spent on study). More 
educated entrepreneurs may also be more risk averse which could affect decisions to invest or 
expand businesses (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). A further reason for the insignificant result is 
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that the benefits of studying will take time to feed through to improved firm performance. 
Finally, some managers might misreport studying time as personal time or vice versa. 
Therefore, lack of statistical significance might simply reflect measurement error.5  
Among the control variables, both Log(Sales) and the dummy of single decision-making are 
statistically significant at 1% level. We find that performance is positively related to size which 
may be explained by economies of scale obtained by larger firms (Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 
2008). In addition, larger size also allows for the possibility of a greater diversification of 
activities, enabling companies to cope more successfully with market changes, as well as with 
high-risk situations (Goddard et al. 2005). We find that previous management experience is not 
significant. The negative sign of the single decision-making dummy suggests that Chinese 
entrepreneurs, making decisions entirely by themselves, might make mistakes in the decision-
making process that will have adverse effects on firm performance. Ownership is found to be 
positively related to performance, a finding consistent with the agency model discussed below.  
As set out in hypothesis H4, we develop the analysis by looking at a subsample that highlights 
potential agency issues and examine the effect of ownership stakes on the hours–performance 
relationship. We test the agency hypothesis that higher managerial ownership improves 
performance by splitting the sample into two groups, one consisting of firms in which the 
manager owner has between 50% and 75% of the shares and the other in which the manager 
owner has more than 75%. This allows us to distinguish between high and very high levels of 
ownership concentration and to evaluate the impact of ownership on the hours-worked-
performance relationship. 
Insert Table 5 
As reported in Panel A of Table 5, we find no relationship between any of the hours variables 
and performance for the 50-75% grouping. However, for the high ownership concentration 
group, ownership in excess of 75%, we find statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
relationships for management hours. The initial part of this result is consistent with Bitler et al. 
(2005) who find a positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ effort and firm performance 
when the level of managerial ownership is very high. However, the inverted-U-shaped nature 
of the result indicates that beyond a certain number of hours, 7.7 for the subsample with 
ownership in excess of 75%, performance suffers. This implies that even at high levels of 
ownership, there are limits to effectiveness of additional hours spent on work activities. 
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Consistent with the agency theory, the results offer some support for Hypothesis 4 and indicate 
that up to a point, for firms with very high managerial ownership, increasing management effort 
benefits firm performance.6  
 
The second sub-sample analyses the impact of managerial experience on the hours-performance 
relationship. We divide the sample into two groups, those that had previous managerial 
experience and those that did not. Entrepreneurs with different work experience are likely to 
develop different patterns of time allocation for different activities.  
 
As Panel B of Table 5 reports, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms run by managers with previous managerial 
experience, with the optimal hours being 5.9. However, we find an insignificant relationship 
for networking and study hours. Our data also reveal an insignificant relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms run by managers without managerial experience. 
These results offer support for Hypothesis 5 given that the effort-performance relationship is 
present in the group that had previous managerial experience. This finding suggests that 
previously accumulated human and social capital complements managerial effort. We also 
observe that networking hours is significant for those without previous management 
experience. This may be because managers with no previous experience may have limited 
access to social networks and will therefore have to commit extra effort to build them up. 
However, too many hours allocated to networking can eventually adversely affect performance. 
 
Additional analysis and robustness checks 
Table 6 presents the results for two further subsamples. First, in relation to gender, it has been 
shown that in transition economies, women entrepreneurs have been found to be disadvantaged 
in their access to male-dominated industry networks and in using the opportunities these 
networks present for business development and growth (Manolova 2005). In addition, 
legislation inherited in transitional economies may have harmed women’s future 
entrepreneurial success because the legislation reduced their chances of obtaining managerial 
experience (Bliss and Garratt 2001). Support for this comes from the fact that, as Table 1 shows, 
women entrepreneurs account for only 12.5 percent of the sample. McKendrick and Carroll 
(2001) argue that the membership of business associations is an important networking forum 
for entrepreneurs. We find that significantly fewer Chinese women entrepreneurs have previous 
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management experience or are members of business associations.  
 
Panel A in Table 6 shows a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management 
hours and performance and between networking and firm performance is found for male 
entrepreneurs. However, even though the density functions, (Figure 1), show similar 
distributions of managerial effort, no such significant relationship is found for female 
entrepreneurs. One reason for this may be that firms with female entrepreneurs are less likely 
to grow than firms with male entrepreneurs and this may therefore partly explain the finding on 
management hours. In addition, there may be some cultural characteristics that could explain 
the insignificant network hours finding; for example it may be more difficult for women to 
establish formal network channels than males, even if they commit effort to informal 
networking. The results imply that the effort made by women entrepreneurs is not directly 
rewarded with better firm performance. No relationship between time spent studying and firm 
performance is found for either male or female entrepreneurs. 
 
Second, different patterns of time allocation by firm size were also reported in Table 3. Baker 
and Hall (2002) develop a model that allows CEO productivity differs for firms of different 
sizes and find that CEOs do a range of activities, the marginal product of which changes with 
size in varying degrees. In Table 6 Panel B, we split the sample by firm size and observe 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance in 
smaller sized firms. This may be due to that small firms have distinct advantages in judging and 
estimating workers’, as well as managers’ performance (Zenger 1994). In contrast, the effort-
performance relationship is insignificant for larger firms. It may be that, in smaller firms, the 
owners’ effort is more obvious to employees, and thus there is a collective effort to help the 
firm to perform better. In contrast, in larger enterprises the manager/owner’s effort may not be 
obvious to employees and supervisors. As a result, it may be more difficult to measure the direct 
link between owner-managers’ effort and firm performance as firm size increases.  
Insert Table 6 
We have also undertaken four additional analyses to check the validity of our main results.7 
First, we employ different measures of performance as dependent variables, including return to 
sales (ROS) calculated by the ratio of net income to total sales; production efficiency calculated 
by output per worker; and innovation measured by the ratio of R&D to equity plus debt. Overall, 
the estimates are in line with those reported in Table 4. Positive impacts on firm performance 
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and diminishing marginal effects are found on both management and networking hours when 
firm performance is measured by ROS. The statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
relationship between management hours and firm performance is also found with output per 
worker used as dependent variable. However, we find no significant effects when innovation is 
used as the dependent variable. This may be due to the effects of time lags, which we are unable 
to address due to data availability. 
Secondly, we add additional explanatory variables in the regressions, including a financial 
constraint (Bank loans/Assets); an innovation dummy (equals to 1, if the firm has patent); and 
a foreign investment dummy (equals to 1, if the firm makes investment overseas) (Du and 
Girma 2012; Liu 2012). The findings remain consistent with the results reported in Table 4.  
The third robustness check is related to the functional form of the time allocation and 
performance relationship. Bandiera et al. (2011), report a logarithmic relationship between 
hours and performance. We adapt our econometric specification (1) by replacing Hours and 
Hours2 with the natural logarithm of Hours. To control for potential endogeneity we employ 
the Lewbel (2012) estimator with both internal and external instruments, as used in the main 
analysis. The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship for management 
hours but insignificant result for networking. Study hours are also insignificant. Thus, the 
quadratic relationship seems to be more appropriate than the logarithmic alternative.  
Fourth, the entrepreneurs who allocate more time in studying may indicate stronger 
commitment to achieve high performance of their businesses. We therefore we did a robustness 
check by treating education as an endogenous variable and found that this did not affect the 
results. In addition, we split the sample into entrepreneurs with or without university education. 
Again we found that study hours remained insignificant.8 
 Conclusions 
This study examines the effect of time allocation on performance for 1,776 Chinese owner-
manager firms in 2004 and 2006. We investigate a question which is fundamental to the success 
of small business owners, namely: what is the best way to allocate the scarce resource of time? 
We answer this question by analyzing how financial performance is affected by the allocation 
of time between different activities. As hypothesised, we find a statistically significant inverted 
U-shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance and between 
networking hours and firm performance. However, we report no relationship between study 
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hours and firm performance. The optimal time allocation for management activities is 6.8 hours 
per day and the optimal networking time allocation is 4.9 hours per day.  
We also analyse the time allocation-performance relationship in relation to agency issues, to 
previous management experience, firm size and to gender. We find no relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms with 50%-75% management ownership but a 
significant quadratic relationship for higher ownership stakes is observed. This indicates that 
there are agency issues in private companies and that the agency conflict is reduced as 
ownership increases. We also find that management experience produces an inverted U-shaped 
relationship for those firms whose managers had previous managerial experience. Similar 
results are found for small firm subsample. In addition, we examine different effects of men 
and women entrepreneurs’ time allocation on firm performance. Significant inverted U-shaped 
relationship between management hours and performance and between networking and firm 
performance are found for men entrepreneurs; but not for women entrepreneurs. 
The analysis has presented new insights into the effects of time allocation of owner-managers 
on the financial performance of firms in China, an economy that is in the process of adopting a 
more market-oriented economic system. A number of policy implications can be derived from 
our results. First, although a work ethic is important, the results offer little justification for 
working long hours because it does not necessarily improve the financial performance of 
companies. This result is particularly interesting given that 23.6% of business owners in our 
data spend more than 8.4 hours per day on management activities. An awareness of the 
importance of time allocation is important for those starting their own business and policy 
makers should try to ensure that entrepreneurs know this. Second, while networking hours are 
important, our results suggest that there are limits to the effectiveness of time spent on this 
activity. The optimal level of networking is estimated to be 4.9 hours per day but 26.2% of 
business owners network more than five hours and 26% less than three hours. These figures 
suggest that firms will improve performance if managers reallocate their time more effectively. 
Third, the failure rate of entrepreneurial firms is high and thus policy makers should provide 
information and assistance in relation to the most efficient use of time. Our results show that 
working long hours does not necessarily improve performance, a finding which is important for 
entrepreneurs. 
We find evidence that the allocation of time across different activities significantly affects 
performance. The results offer support for the increasing opportunity cost model which argues 
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that performance and effort will be positively related up to a certain number of hours and that 
beyond that point, the relationship will become negative. Investment in social capital also 
positively affects performance but too many hours spend on that activity will produce negative 
returns. However, our analysis of the impact of human capital factors produced insignificant 
results. This may be explained by the fact that the data did not enable an inter-temporal analysis 
to be undertaken and that increases in human capital has no short run impact on performance.  
The analysis does have a number of limitations. First, the use of survey data which relies on 
self-reporting of hours raises the problem of accuracy and recall bias. Therefore further in-depth 
analysis of case studies may offer additional insights. Second, the structure of the survey does 
not permit the use of panel data techniques, which would provide a richer analysis of the effort-
performance relationship. Third, while providing rich source for research exploration, a number 
of important variables for example ownership concentration or industry-specific human capital 
are not present in our data which could indicate omitted variables bias. 
The study offers a number of directions for further research. First, further studies could be 
undertaken to construct a database of the relationship over time. This would enable the analysis 
to address issues such as the reaction of activity hours to poor, or good performance. Lagged 
effects could also be analysed. Furthermore, the effect of studying hours on performance might 
only be observed in the long run. Second, an interesting extension of our work could involve 
exploring the effectiveness of the way in which time is allocated. It might be a case, that 
working less but more efficiently has much greater effect on performance than working more 
hours but being less efficient. This would offer potential insights into the need for an effective 
work-life balance. Third, the analysis relates to China and it would be instructive to see how far 
the relationships extend to other emerging economies. Fourth, an assessment of entrepreneurial 
motivation might offer additional insights into the allocation of time-performance relationship. 
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Endnotes 
1Glaeser et al. (2002) argue that people who investment in human capital are also likely to invest in 
social capital. 
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2The results for levels of hours are available on request. 
3In addition to the logarithm of total sales we have also experimented with the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees. The results are quantitatively similar to those reported in this work. 
4 See also Fung et al. (2007) for a description of the same dataset. 
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6 Ownership concentration could be another important characteristic to control for. Unfortunately, our 
data source does not report any plausible proxies for this factor. 
7The estimates are available on request. 
8The full results are available on request 
 
24 
 
References 
Abernethy, Margaret, Jan Bouwens, and Laurence Van Lent. 2013. The Role of Performance 
Measures in the Intertemporal Decisions of Business Unit Managers, Contemporary 
Accounting Research 30 (3): 925-961. 
Adler, Paul and Seok-Woo Kwon. 2002. Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. Academy 
of Management Review 27 (1): 17-40. 
Anderson, Alistair, Jin-Hai Li, Richard Harrison, and Paul Robson. 2003. The Increasing Role 
of Small Business in the Chinese Economy. Journal of Small Business Management 41(3): 310-
316. 
Andres, Christian. 2008. Large Shareholders and Firm Performance - an Empirical 
Examination of Founding-family Ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance 14(4): 431-
446. 
Ang, James, Rebel Cole, and James Lin. 2000. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. 
Journal of Finance 55: 81-106.  
Baker, George, and Brian Hall. 2004. CEO Incentives and Firm Size. Journal of Labour 
Economics 22(4):767-798. 
Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. 2011. What Do CEOs 
Do? Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper DP8235. 
Bandiera, Oriana, Anrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. 2013. Managing the Family Firm: 
Evidence from CEOs at Work. Harvard Business School Discussion Paper 14-044. 
Becker, Gary. 1965. A Theory of the Allocation of Time. Economic Journal 75(299): 493-517. 
Becker, Gary. 1975. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Education. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, NY.  
Beffy, Magali, Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Guy Laroque. 2014. Labour Supply and 
Taxation with Restricted Choices. IFS Working Paper, W14/04. 
Bitler, Marianne, Tobias Moskovitz, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen. 2005. Testing Agency 
Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth. Journal of Finance 60(2): 539-576. 
Bliss, Richard, and Nocole Garratt. 2001. Supporting Women Entrepreneurs in 
Transitioning Economies. Journal of Small Business Management 39(4): 336–344. 
 
Bosma, Nils, Mirjam van Praag, Roy Thurik, and Gerrit de Wit. 2004. The Value of Human 
and Social Capital Investments for the Business Performance of Startups. Small Business 
Economics 23(3): 227-36. 
25 
 
Breusch, Trevor, and Adrian Pagan. 1979. A Simple Test for Heteroskedasticity and Random 
Coefficient variation. Econometrica 47 (5): 1287-1294. 
Burmeister-Lamp, Katrin, Moren Levesque, and Christian Schade. 2012. Are Entrepreneurs 
Influenced by Risk Attitude, Regulatory Focus or Both? An Experiment on Entrepreneurs’ 
Time Allocation. Journal of Business Venturing 27(4): 456-476. 
Cao, Jerry, Yuan Ding, and Hua Zhang. 2014. Social Capital, Informal Governance and Post 
IPO Firm Performance: A Study of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms, Journal of Business Ethics 
134 (4): 1-23. 
Cassar, Gavin. 2006. Entrepreneur Opportunity Cost and Intended Venture Growth. Journal of 
Business Venturing 21(6): 610-632. 
Chen, Ming-Huei, Yu-Yu Chang, and Chia-Yu Lee. 2015. Creative Entrepreneurs' Guanxi 
Networks and Success: Information and Resource. Journal of Business Research 68(4): 900-
905. 
Chetty, Raj. 2012. Bounds on Elasticities With Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro 
and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply. Econometrica 80(3): 969-1018 
Davidsson, Per, and Benson Honig. 2003. The Role of Social and Human Capital among 
Nascent Entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 18(3): 301-331. 
Dickson, Pat, George Solomon, and K. Mark Weaver. 2008. Entrepreneurial Selection and 
Success: Does Education Matter?” Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 
15(2): 239-258. 
Du, Jun, and Sourafel Girma. 2012. Firm Size, Source of Finance, and Growth - Evidence from 
China. International Journal of the Economics of Business 19(3): 397-419. 
Ehrenberg, Roland and Robert Smith. 2000. Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public 
Policy. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. 
Fafchamps, Marcel, and Bart Minten. 2002. Returns to Social Network Capital among Traders. 
Oxford Economic Papers 54(2): 173-206. 
Fama, Eugene, and Michael Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of 
Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325. 
Florén, Henrik. 2006. Managerial Work in Small Firms: Summarising What We Know and 
Sketching a Research Agenda. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and 
Research 12(5): 272-288. 
Florén, Henrik, and Joakim. Tell. 2012. Managerial Behaviour and Small Firm Performance, 
working paper, Centre for Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Learning, Halmstad University.  
Florin, Juan, Michael Lubatkin, and William Schulze. 2003. A Social Capital Model of 
26 
 
High-Growth Ventures. Academy of Management Journal 46(3): 374-384. 
Fung, Hung-Gay, Xiaoqing Xu, and Qi-Zi Zhang. 2007. On the Financial Performance of 
Private Enterprises in China. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 12(4): 399-414. 
Ganotakis, Panagiotis. 2012. Founders’ Human Capital and the Performance in UK New 
Technology Based Firms. Small Business Economics 39(2): 495-515. 
Glaeser, Edward, David Laibson, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2002. The Economic Approach to 
Social Capital. Economic Journal 112(8): F437-F458. 
Goddard, John, Manouche Tavakoli, and John Wilson. 2005. Determinants of Profitability in 
European Manufacturing and Services: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data. Applied 
Financial Economics 15(18): 1269-1282.  
Ham, John, and Kevin Reilly. 2002. Testing Intertemporal Substitution, Implicit Contracts, and 
Hours Restriction Models of the Labor Market using Micro Data. American Economic Review 
92(4): 905-927. 
Holmström, Benkt, and Jan Tirole. 1997. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the 
Real Sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3): 663-692. 
Hyytinen, Ari, and Olli-Pekka- Ruuskanen. 2007. Time Use of the Self-employed. Kyklos 
60(1): 105-122. 
Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. 
Lee, Don, and Eric Tsang. 2001. The Effects of Entrepreneurial Personality, Background and 
Network Activities on Venture Growth.” Journal of Management Studies 38(4): 583-602. 
Levesque, Moren, Dean Shepherd, and Evan Douglas. 2002. Employment or Self-employment: 
A Dynamic Utility Maximizing Model. Journal of Business Venturing 17(3): 189-210.  
Lewbel, Arthur. 2012. Using Heteroscedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and 
Endogenous Regressor Models. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 30(1): 67-80. 
Liu, Jia. 2012. The Dynamics of Listed SMEs in China. International Journal of the Economics 
of Business 19(3): 421-450. 
Lynskey, Michael. 2004. Determinants of innovative activity in Japanese technology-based 
start-up firms. International Small Business Journal 22(2): 159-196. 
Malmendier, Ulricke, and Geoffrey Tate. 2009. Superstar CEO’s. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 124(4): 1593-638. 
Manolova, Tataina. 2005. Builders and leaders: Six case studies of men and women small 
proprietors in the Bulgarian construction industry. In C.G. Brush, N.M. Carter, E. Gatewood, 
27 
 
P.G. Greene, and M. Hart (Eds.), Growth oriented women entrepreneurs and their businesses: 
A global research perspective (pp. 232–259). Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
McKendrick, David, and Glen Carroll. 2001. On the Genesis of Organizational Forms: 
Evidence from the Market for Disk Arrays. Organization Science, 12(6): 661–682. 
McKnight, Philip J., and Charlie Weir. 2009. Agency Costs, Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Ownership Structure in Large Publicly Quoted Companies: a Panel Data 
Analysis. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49(2): 135-158. 
Morris, Michael, and Minet Schindehutte. 2005. Entrepreneurial Values and the Ethnic 
Enterprise: an Examination of Six Subcultures. Journal of Small Business Management 43(4): 
453-479. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 2013. China Statistical Year Book 2013. China 
Statistics Press, Beijing. 
O’Gorman, Colum, Sarah Bourke, and John Murray. 2005. The Nature of Managerial Work in 
Small Growth-oriented Small Businesses.” Small Business Economics 25(1): 1-16. 
Robb, Alicia. 2002. Entrepreneurial Performance by Women and Minorities: the Case of New 
Firms. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 7(4): 383–397. 
Robb, Alicia and John Watson. 2012. Gender Differences in Firm Performance: Evidence from 
New Ventures in the United States. Journal of Business Venturing 27(5): 544-558. 
Rose, Casper. 2005. Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance in Listed Danish Firms: in 
Search of the Missing link. European Management Journal 23(5): 542-553. 
Serrasqueiro, Zelia and Paulo Macas Nunes. 2008. Performance and size: empirical evidence 
from Portuguese SMEs. Small Business Economics 31(2): 195-217. 
Sheng, Shibin, Kevin Zhou, and Juli Li. 2011. The Effects of Business and Political Ties on 
Firm Performance: Evidence from China. Journal of Marketing, 75(1): 1-15. 
Sturman, Michael. 2003. Searching for the Inverted U-Shaped Relationship between Time and 
Performance: Meta-Analyses of the Experience/Performance, Tenure/Performance, and 
Age/Performance Relationship. Journal of Management 29(5): 609-640. 
Talavera, Oleksandr, Lin Xiong, and Xing Xiong. 2012. Social Capital and Access to Bank 
Financing: The Case of Chinese Entrepreneurs. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 48(1): 
55-69. 
Unger, Jens, Andreas Rauch, Michael Frese, and Nina Rosenbusch. 2011. Human Capital and 
Entrepreneurial Success: a Meta-Analytical Review. Journal of Business Venturing 26(3): 341-
358. 
28 
 
Verheul, Ingrid, Martin Carree, and Roy Thurik. 2009. Allocation of productivity and time in 
new ventures of female and male entrepreneurs. Small Business Economics 33(3): 273-291. 
Von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf and Stefan Ruenzi. 2014. CEO Ownership, Stock Market 
Performance, and Managerial Discretion. Journal of Finance 69(3): 1013-1050. 
Volery Thierry, Susan Muller, Frtiz Oser, Catherine Naepflin, and Nuria del Rey. 2013. The 
Impact of Entrepreneurship Education on Human Capital at Upper-Secondary Level. Journal 
of Small Business Management 51(3): 429-446. 
Zenger, Tos. 1994. Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency 
Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size. 
Management Science 40(6): 708-729. 
29 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample.  
 
 Mean s.d. Median 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Main Variables    
Return on assets 0.327 0.514 0.165
Management hours per day 6.816 2.365 7.000
Management hours per day divided by 24 0.284 0.099 0.292
Networking hours per day 3.847 1.928 4.000
Networking hours per day divided by 24 0.160 0.080 0.167
Study hours per day 1.559 0.900 1.000
Study hours per day divided by 24 0.065 0.038 0.042
Log(Age) 3.769 0.176 3.761
Log(Firm Age) 1.735 0.713 1.792
Log(Sales) 6.272 1.952 6.234
Management Experience 0.290 0. 454 0.000
Single-decision making 0.565 0. 496 1.000
Education 0.181 0.385 0.000
Female 0.125 0.331 0.000
Share of ownership 0.812 0.170 0.800
 
Instrumental Variables 
Log(Household expenditure) 1.833 0.819 1.792
Log(Management team size) 1.919 1.193 1.792
Log(Number of family members) 1.229 0.440 1.099
Personal income divided by household income 0.720 0.221 0.714
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Figure 1: Kernel density management hour (share) by gender 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix. 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ROA 1 1            
Management 
hours 2 0.002 1          
 
Networking 
hours 3 
-
0.063*** 
-
0.438*** 1         
 
Study hours 4 0.001 -0.099*** -0.017 1        
 
Log(Age) 5 0.026 0.132*** -0.059*** 0.037* 1       
 
Log(FirmAge) 6 0.018 0.056*** -0.013 0.065*** 0.257*** 1       
Log(Sales) 7 0.066*** -0.002 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.281*** 1      
Management 
Experience 8 -0.001 -0.039** 0.071*** 0.054*** 0.171*** 0.021 0.128*** 1    
 
Single- 
decision 
making 
9 -0.062*** 
-
0.062*** 0.097*** 0.13*** -0.039* 0.007 0.29*** 0.05** 1   
 
Education 10 -0.052** -0.064*** 0.067*** 0.113***
-
0.088*** -0.036* 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.174*** 1  
 
Female 11 0.017 0.061*** -0.099*** -0.014 
-
0.072*** 
-
0.077*** 
-
0.135*** 
-
0.063*** -0.015 
-
0.001 1 
 
Ownership 12 0.066*** 0.038* -0.058*** -0.003 0.016 0.098*** 
-
0.169*** -0.047** 
-
0.299*** 
-
0.092 0.07*** 
1 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Hour Variables by Ownership, Management Experience, 
Gender and Size. 
Panel A: By ownership 
 50% <ownership ≤ 75% 75% < ownership  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference
Management hours 6.726 0.076 977 6.871 0.059 1,608 -0.145 
Networking hours 3.978 0.067 885 3.767 0.049 1,456 0.211** 
Study hours 1.578 0.025 977 1.614 0.021 1,608 -0.036 
 
Panel B: By management experience 
 With management 
experience
Without management 
experience
 
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference
Management hours 6.672 0.087 750 6.875 0.055 1,835 -0.203**
Networking hours 4.058 0.073 692 3.758 0 .047 1,649 0.3*** 
Study hours 1.619 0.029 750 1.593 0.019 1,835 0.025 
 
Panel C: By gender 
 Male Entrepreneurs Female Entrepreneurs  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference
Management hours 6.834 0.06 1,570 7.168 0.153 211 -0.334**
Networking hours 3.951 0.051 1,306 3.332 0.138 170 0.619***
Study hours 1.524 0.022 1,413 1.57 0.07 211 -0.046 
 
Panel D: By size 
 Log(Sales) above median Log(Sales) below median  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference
Management hours 6.877 0.076 890 6.87 0.081 886 0.007 
Networking hours 4.055 0.067 853 3.686 0.069 774 0.369***
Study hours 1.626 0.029 862 1.428 0.03 815 0.198***
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate t-test significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Results for instrumental variables regressions for firm performance and activity 
hours.  
 Management Networking Study 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Hours (share) 
3.689* 
(2.056) 
1.911* 
(1.009)   
0.278 
(2.015) 
Hours2 (share) 
-6.508* 
(3.768) 
-4.723** 
(2.175)  
-1.292 
(7.145) 
Log(Age) 
-0.02 
(0.077) 
-0.029 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.073) 
Log(Firm Age) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.028 
(0.02) 
Log(Sales) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Management Experience 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
-0.01 
(0.027) 
Single-decision making 
-0.072*** 
(0.024) 
-0.078*** 
(0.026) 
-0.085*** 
(0.029) 
Ownership 
0.174** 
(0.071) 
0.1 
(0.072) 
0.131* 
(0.072) 
Education 
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.087*** 
(0.026) 
-0.062** 
(0.03) 
Female 
0.07** 
(0.036) 
0.079** 
(0.037) 
0.05 
(0.035) 
N. Obs. 1,776 1,627 1,677 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Under-identification test 63.159*** 87.079*** 53.892*** 
Over-identification test 25.899 28.693 25.992 
Optimal Hours 6.802 4.856 2.584 
Optimal Hours 95% CI [5.218, 8.385] [3.371, 6.341] [-9.683, 14.851] 
Mean VIF 5.57 3.1 2.26 
F-test 4.17*** 4.16*** 3.55*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent variable 
is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time dummies 
are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally generated 
instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the natural logarithm 
of entrepreneur's family size, and the share of personal income in total household income.) Optimal 
Hours is the level of activity hours that maximizes performance. Optimal Hours 95% CI is the 95% 
confidence interval for optimal activity hours. 
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Table 5: Results for instrumental variables regressions for firm performance and activity hours 
for subsamples. 
 
Panel A: By ownership 
Subsample 50% <ownership ≤ 75%       ownership > 75% 
 Management (1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 0.423 (3.227) 
-1.004 
(1.14) 
0.787 
(2.713) 
5.563** 
(2.742) 
1.357 
(1.101) 
-0.628 
(1.907) 
Hours2(share) -2.623 (5.583) 
0.939 
(2.322) 
-4.12 
(8.656) 
-8.684* 
(4.874) 
-3.811 
(2.645) 
0.994 
(6.367) 
N. Obs. 863 783 780 1,103 1,012 1,035 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
Panel B: By management experience 
Subsample With management experience Without management experience 
 Management (1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 6.784** (2.836) 
0.475 
(1.932) 
-2.086 
(2.619)
0.869 
(2.554) 
2.635* 
(1.235) 
0.467 
(3.723) 
Hours2(share) -13.896** (5.759) 
-2.336 
(4.124) 
6.557 
(8.406)
-0.17 
(4.855) 
-5.693* 
(2.584) 
-1.101 
(14.442)
N. Obs. 529 492 512 1,116 1,024 1,043 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent 
variable is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally 
generated instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the 
natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the natural logarithm of firm’s management 
team size and the share of personal income in total household income.)  
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Table 6: Additional analyses for firm performance and activity hours 
 
Panel A: By gender 
Subsample Male Entrepreneurs Female Entrepreneurs 
 Management (1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 4.147** (2.044) 
3.166*** 
(1.049) 
3.907 
(4.589) 
1.024 
(2.79) 
0.276 
(1.635) 
-5.587 
(4.209) 
Hours2(share) -8.22** (3.948) 
-7.722*** 
(2.281) 
-24.973 
(33.679)
7.655 
(7.627) 
-1.107 
(4.214) 
37.285 
(34.577)
N. Obs. 1,570 1,306 1,413 186 170 211 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.01 
 
Panel B: By size 
Subsample Log(Sales) below median Log(Sales) above median 
 Management (1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 4.879** (2.268) 
0.31 
(1.164) 
0.783 
(3.11) 
2.054 
(3.556) 
0.696 
(1.329) 
4.158 
(5.596)
Hours2(share) -8.686** (3.931) 
-0.497 
(2.801) 
-19.794 
(25.391)
-5.757 
(6.948) 
-2.516 
(2.646) 
-
34.941 
(38.85)
N. Obs. 739 777 890 917 874 917 
R2 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent 
variable is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally 
generated instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the 
natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the natural logarithm of firm’s management 
team size and the share of personal income in total household income.)  
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